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DD/S 59-4156

CONFERENCE OF SENIOR SUPPORT OFFICERS

14, 15, 16 October 1959

WEDNESDAY, 14 October

0930 - 1000:	Introduction	Colonel White
1000 - 1130:	"Intelligence Problems in the World Today"	Mr. Kent
1200 - 1300:	Lunch	
1300 - 1430:	"Future Trends in the Agency and Implications for Support"	Mr. Kirkpatrick
1445 - 1700:	"The Role and Future of Support Officers"	Colonel White

THURSDAY, 15 October

0830 - 1230:	"Some Current and Future Considerations in Support Activities:	
0830 - 0930:	Office of Logistics	Mr. Garrison
0945 - 1045:	Office of the Comptroller	Mr. Saunders
1100 - 1230:	Office of Personnel	Mr. Stewart
1300 - 1400:	Lunch	
1400 - 1530:	"Future Trends and Developments in the Clandestine Services"	Mr. Bissell
1600 - 1700:	"Some New Techniques in Communications"	General McClelland

FRIDAY, 16 October

0900 - 1030:	"The Support Role as Seen by a Division Chief"	Mr. Critchfield
1100 - 1200:	Committee Meetings	
1200 - 1300:	Lunch	
1300 - 1430:	Summary Session	Colonel White

All times given are EDST

HISTORICAL DOCUMENTDestroy only with consent
of the Historical StaffName: Mr. R. C. Dorman
Date: 6 NOV 1967

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INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY

Mr. Kent

Mr. Kent chose to discuss this topic generally instead of restricting his remarks to intelligence problems. Accordingly, he set the background for "Problems in the World Today" by enumerating five results of World War II which have strikingly influenced the world.

1. Emergence of U.S. in '45 as world's strongest power.
2. Defeat of Germany and Japan, leaving power vacuums in Eastern Europe and in the Far East.
3. Emergence of USSR, "groggy but game", resolved to press on to the next round of power.
4. Weakening of Britain and other European powers.
5. Weakening of imperial control of colonial powers.

Mr. Kent then described areas of conflict that arose from the above situations:

1. Conflicts with the Soviets.
2. Conflicts with the Chinese.
3. Conflicts in our own alliances (e.g., Algeria - France)
4. Domestic conflicts within given states of allies.
5. Conflicts in the Bloc itself.

His specific examples of areas where these larger conflicts have manifested themselves included Berlin, Laos, India, Kerala, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Central and South America, and countries of the Caribbean.

Two statements in Mr. Kent's talk were of particular interest to the writer. One was that resistance movements during World War II were inevitably penetrated by Communists and it is these Communist elements which have become the hard cores of these groups today. The second statement, though not unfamiliar to most people, was interesting to hear from as

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eminent an authority as Mr. Kent. He stated that never before in the history of the world have there been so many explosive situations on the globe; never before have there been such heavy responsibilities on world leaders.



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Outline of Presentation by Mr. Kirkpatrick

Conference of Senior Support Officers

14 October 1959

FUTURE TRENDS IN THE AGENCY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SUPPORT

I. WORLD SCENE

A. Khrushchev Visit

Forerunner of other East-West exchanges and influence in "thawing" cold war. "Thaw" won't cause U. S. to relax defense posture, but public showing increasing concern for peace and will raise questions about expenditures for defense and intelligence.

B. Intense Competition for Influence in Undeveloped Areas

Many countries emerging from colonialism are unready for independence and will be easy prey. Superficially, competition for influence with such countries will be "friendly," but underneath will be a deadly serious struggle.

C. Acceleration of Uncommitted Bloc

More and more countries will try to move to uncommitted bloc as East-West struggle continues. This trend already evident in Middle East, Africa, and even Latin America.

II. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

A. Pressures to "Cut Back"

Based on experience at end of WW II, can expect growing pressure on intelligence community to "cut back" as we move into "coexistence." Bureau of Budget in forefront this trend which already visible.

B. Pressure on CIA to Assume Functions of Other Agencies

As other agencies cut intelligence activities, they will pressure CIA to take on some of their functions--USIA on PP side and military services on FI side. CIA must resist these pressures.

III. CIA

A. General

Must continue reducing size of Agency. Have been fortunate in past with money; can't expect this to continue.

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More research will be done externally. Internal research concerned with highly classified materials and with "melding" total research effort.

C. DD/P

Must get out of fields, such as political reporting, where we don't belong. Must stop "numbers racket" in intelligence reporting and concentrate on highly selective approach. Must stay out of overt propaganda and get out of grey areas. Stay-behind ops essential, but should shift PM to Special Forces.

D. Personnel

Must continue reducing til resignees complain of "working too hard" instead of being part of overstaffing.

E. Relations with Congress

Fine in past, but can expect continued efforts to establish "watchdog committee." Problem will continue until we can establish means to provide proper members with immediate information to shut off attacks on floor.

F. New Building

Won't house all of Headquarters. Public disclosure of this when we move in late summer of '61 will heighten pressure to cut size.

G. Methods of Personnel Reduction

Will not use Civil Service RIF; must develop own system. Must have equitable selection-out program that is carefully devised and fairly administered.

IV. SUPPORT OFFICES

A. Personnel--Must carry "laboring oar" on Agency's reduction in size and also insure that small increment of new professionals are best we can get.

B. Training--Something we must have and more of. Agency, as grows smaller, must be better trained.

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C. Security--Will always be with us. Doing magnificent job now. Must be more control over levies on Security for support functions.

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- D. Comptroller--Recognizes restiveness over new financial control system. But for first time we'll know what things really cost.
- E. Logistics--Must look very carefully at itself on point of stocking everything we need.
- F. Other DD/S Elements--About right at present.

V. CONCLUSIONS

- A. Must maintain Agency in very flexible position and not solidify to degree where we can't change quickly.
- B. Must maintain ourselves as free from bureaucracy as possible. The fewer regulations the better; same for paperwork. Must have controls, but keep them simple. DD/S Taskforce on Procedures good example of what we can do on this point.

QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD

In response to questions, Mr. Kirkpatrick made the following additional comments of special interest:

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- 3. Support Procedures Committee is a fine idea and should result in improvements and savings. Tighter discipline in a number of administrative areas will save money. Examples are tighter controls on: authorizing printing and reproduction; authorizing foreign travel; and authorizing library purchases. To achieve tighter discipline, more responsibility must be placed on supervisors and we must be tougher with them when they get out of line.
- 4. It is unfortunate that the selection-out program has sometimes given the impression that it is intended for cases involving "cause" and inefficiency. The initial cases processed through this system did fall in the preceding

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categories. However, the program is intended for persons whose skills are no longer needed or for those who have not kept up with their competitive groups. The key to the whole selection-out program is the fitness report, which must be honest and objective.

5. To overcome any possible morale problems that might result from the slowdown of Agency promotions and the cutback of overtime, we must increase individual job satisfaction by making CIA a better organization. With the possible exception of accelerated retirement, there are very few additional tangible benefits we can look forward to.
6. All components of the Agency should be more selective in admitting members to career status. When the career program was first started, Gen. Smith expressed a desire for an "elite service." When this was studied carefully, the "elite" concept was rejected. However, at least some tendency in this direction by way of greater selectivity is desirable.

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THE ROLE AND FUTURE OF SUPPORT OFFICERS

Colonel White

Colonel White began by describing the evolution of a concept which we have today -- centralized support. He described General Smith's conference on Administration and his historic conference on the merger of OSO and OPC with the consequent establishment of DDP/Administration. From then, in 1952, up to the present there has been increased emphasis on developing common understandings, a common language, mutual respect between operations and support. On this solid base of agreement even more building can be done, Colonel White feels, through development of professional competence of Support Officers generally and of "Generalists" in this area particularly. He urged every Support Officer to learn as much as possible about the various Support Offices and Staffs and as much as possible about operations.

The next portion of his talk might be titled, "So -- Where Do We Go From Here?". In an effort to answer this question Colonel White presented several sets of statistics, principally promotion rates where such rates in the entire Agency, the rates within Deputy Director (Support), Deputy Director (Plans), and Deputy Director (Intelligence), and the rate within the "SA" careerists category were compared and found to be reasonably uniform across the board. Average ages of staff personnel were then presented in various categories, some retirement eligibility figures were given within the supergrades, and numbers of GS-14, GS-15, and SG positions considered open to "generalists" were cited by Colonel White.

As a result of these facts, Colonel White drew these conclusions:

1. Rapid promotion opportunities are gone.
2. Promotion is highly competitive.
3. As a group, the SA's are no worse off than other professional groups in the Agency.
4. Not all of the conference members would attain supergrades.
5. In 1959, a peak of GS-14 or GS-15 in no way connotes failure and must be looked upon philosophically as one of the differences between this age in our Agency and the more expanding era of five years ago.

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To wind up his talk, Colonel White added these points describing his own approach and philosophy about the future of Support Officers:

1. There are two avenues of approach to promotions: one (constituting about two-thirds of all the opportunities for SA generalists) via openings in the Support Offices, and the other through openings under the immediate jurisdiction of Deputy Director (Support) but outside the DD/S Offices. SA's must certainly, then, consider returning to Support Offices.
2. The importance of having overseas experience is still a consideration in any career planning for Support Officers. Colonel White urged all who have not "made the circuit" to do so.
3. Colonel White will not hesitate to take in new blood at any level provided the qualifications of such individuals are high enough to warrant consideration. Similarly, he will resist transfer of others who are not ready for the competition.
4. In conclusion, Colonel White indicated that if any individuals felt that other job areas looked more attractive, he would understand their efforts to locate elsewhere. If not, those who wished to make a career of Support had his friendly backing, and he suggested that such people provide their leadership with integrity of purpose, careful consideration of their own careers, and loyalty to the Agency.

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15 October 1959

**SOME CURRENT AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
IN SUPPORT ACTIVITIES
OFFICE OF LOGISTICS**

[Redacted]
Deputy Director, OL

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Unique aspects of logistics within the Agency, as opposed to the military are attributable to the need for: 1) speed of movement without prior planning; 2) flexibility to meet unusual requirements; 3) operational readiness capability; 4) clandestine capability--especially in the field of procurement.

The five areas of Office of Logistics operations which most directly involve other Agency components are: planning, procurement, real estate and construction, supply, and transportation.

Planning

The Planning Staff is the focal point in the Office of Logistics for coordination with DD/P and Support components on the logistics support aspects of hot and cold war plans including, respectively, projects

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- [Redacted]
- a. Hot war planning is guided by the terms of the "Collated Document" (DOD-CIA Logistics Responsibilities Agreement) and the CIA Global War Plan. The Office of Logistics reviews Agency war plans for logistics implications and assists war planners in determining materiel requirements.
 - b. In support of cold war operations, the primary responsibility of the Office of Logistics is the positioning of, and maintaining in ready-for-use condition, balanced packs within CONUS and overseas suitable for aerial delivery with 72 hours.

The Planning Staff develops lists of materiel and requirements to be levied on the military in support of FMD/PP plans, and assists in the development of Logistics Annexes to programs and projects.

Logistics has developed the concept of the Contingency Task Force, a mobile type organization, to support a FM situation, and is presently working on a training program to build an effective support team. It has also developed the concept of a transportable base.

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Procurement

The complexity of the Agency procurement function, especially for the technical services, makes it particularly important for those services to bring the Procurement Division into the early stages of planning. Procurement has developed a variety of contracts to fit almost any situation. It also has security clearances on, and basic agreements with, most of the firms to which the technical services look for supplies and services.

[redacted] are now authorized to procure locally on a limited basis for the field.

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[redacted] was recently established to service procurement contracts in that area.

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Real Estate and Construction

The Real Estate and Construction Division of the Office of Logistics is the Office of Record for all the Agency's real estate holdings, including proprietaries and subsidiaries. Cooperation of the Support Officers is required to make this record complete and to keep up to date.

Advance coordination with RECD of administrative project plans containing delegations of authority to expend funds for real estate transactions will ensure 1) that RECD experience is brought to bear during the initial planning, and 2) that property records are kept up to date. Good prior planning with RECD will also prevent waste which results from rushing uncoordinated construction authorizations through in the last quarter of the fiscal year.

The budget for alterations, repairs, and moving expense will diminish progressively until the Agency is relocated in the new building. The budget for this purpose in 1961 is only 41 per cent of that for 1959. GSA has also suffered drastic budget cuts and can no longer pick up the Agency tab for these services on a non-reimbursable basis. Support Officers can help by killing at the source requests for such services.

Supply

[redacted] established [redacted] for storage of the Agency's strategic reserve stock. Overseas supply bases provide secondary storage and issue points for strategic materiel.

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The Supply Division has greatly improved its stock control system over the past year.

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Transportation

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Transportation management seeks ^{the} best means (single or combined) of shipment, consistent with criteria of operational security, speed, and economy.

General

The Office of Logistics is currently examining the entire Agency logistics system on a global basis, with the objective of improving all aspects of logistics service.

 stressed throughout his comments the importance of early coordination with the Office of Logistics on all plans and projects requiring planning participation or direct action by Logistics.

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Mr. Saunders' Address to the Senior Support
Officers Conference, 15 October 1959

1. At the Senior Support Officers Conference, 14 through 16 October 1959, Mr. Saunders, the Agency Comptroller, spoke on the subject of "Budget and Accounting Trends." Mr. Saunders' remarks and the answer to a related question are presented below in summarized form.

2. In his introductory statement, Mr. Saunders noted that current trends can be summed up in just two words -- "more information." Like other DD/S organizations such as Medical or Logistics, the Office of the Comptroller gives service, and to give service, it needs information. However, the Comptroller's office is subject to more demands for information than any other office. These demands fall into several major categories: (a) legal demands, (b) Congressional Committee demands, (c) Bureau of the Budget demands, (d) Agency management needs and demands, and (e) various other demands such as those from the US Intelligence Board, the National Security Council, and the President's Board of Consultants.

3. The demands imposed by law are many, e.g., property control requirements, performance and cost budgeting, and cost accounting in lieu of detailed allotment control. Currently we are most concerned with a request from the General Accounting Office to perform a comprehensive audit. If performed, as directed by a 1950 law, this would be much broader than just a financial audit. However, it has been agreed that the audit will not include unvouchered funds.

4. Demands from Congressional Committees and the Bureau of the Budget are not new. In OSS days we gave more information of some kinds than we give today. However, in the past several years Congress has asked a large number of extremely specific questions, (such as "How much do you pay to resistance groups?"), and this year the Bureau of the Budget has asked us for a variety of additional budgetary submissions; office, area, and station briefings; supplementary hearings; and policy reviews. For the first time in Agency history, the Bureau is requiring a separate apportionment for each of the three major Agency components. Each of these acts results in additional requirements upon the Comptroller's office for information.

5. After briefly reviewing the Agency's internal management demands, Mr. Saunders concluded by outlining some approaches to the meeting of these internal and external demands. These approaches include: centralized financial liaison services, improved accounting and reporting system, training, and electronic data processing.

Mr. Saunders' Address to the Senior Support
Officers Conference, 15 October 1959 (Cont'd)

6. At the conclusion of the lecture, the question was asked: "Does anybody plan to challenge the charter of the Bureau of the Budget by which they propose to include policy reviews?" In answer, Mr. Saunders noted that this is being discussed and has been referred to the Director. Col. White commented further regarding this question, saying that there is a tremendous misunderstanding as to the role of the Bureau. The Bureau of the Budget does have responsibility to review everybody's budget in behalf of the President, although perhaps Bureau representatives should not go as far as they do. The only way they can be stopped is to have the DCI go to the President. The DCI probably would not do this and in any case it would not be wise; it would give Congressmen more ammunition if it could be said that nobody at all was reviewing our budget. In the long run, it is better to go along with the Bureau of the Budget.

The questioner then commented that "this is all right to a point, but in questioning operational techniques, they're going too far."

Col. White responded that he couldn't agree more, but that in the final analysis, they do not impose their views on us -- the DCI makes the final decision. Col. White concluded that often we are our own worst enemy; both here and overseas we tell them things we shouldn't. He stated that the Comptroller is in a better position to perform Agency liaison with the Bureau representatives and it is preferred that other Agency elements not deal with them directly.

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Acting Deputy Chief,
Budget Division

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SOME CURRENT AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

IN SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Mr. Stewart

I. Personnel Problems in the Clandestine Services

The personnel problems of the Deputy Director (Plans) are different from the other components of the Agency for some of the following reasons:

(a) The Clandestine Services is a composite organization in that it has personnel from several career services.

(b) The Clandestine Services is committed to rapid rotation. This has created a "busy mill" of assignments and reassignments, and also a "promotion mill" where personnel are promoted while serving overseas, and do not fit into the Headquarters' structure upon their return.

(c) The Clandestine Services has an unusually strong need to train and develop leadership due to the number of senior positions it is required to fill. (Chiefs of Stations, Bases, Divisions and Branches)

II. Personnel Management Structure in the Clandestine Services

Consideration has been given to the establishment of a separate personnel management structure in the Clandestine Services.

The advantages would be:

(a) A more careful review of personnel selected for the Clandestine Services,

(b) More "rights and privileges" for those in the Clandestine Services, and

(c) Simplification of our manpower planning.

The chief disadvantage lies in the fact that such a system would split the Agency and split the Clandestine Services, and cause inequality in pay. The above factors have been considered by the Career Council and it has been decided that the Clandestine Services personnel management program should not be separated from that of the Agency.

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III. Personnel Policy Five Years from Now and the "Battle of the Bulge"

The Agency does not have a generalized manpower problem since the problems differ from Service to Service. In this presentation the statistics used are those relating to the Clandestine Services. The statistics reveal two problems -- we have a "hump" in age level, and we have a "hump" in grade level. In discussing this problem and "hump" legislation with the Civil Service Commission, the Bureau of the Budget, and White House personnel authorities we were advised that:

(a) We should not request "hump" legislation that would give the impression that we were using this as a means of separating surplus personnel, and

(b) We should draw up a personnel structure for the Agency at a grade level that we could operate and live with for the next ten to fifteen years. Such a structure should permit personnel to reach grades GS-14 and GS-15 in their early forties and would allow the "leaders" to remain in positions of responsibility for a considerable period of time.

IV. Future Steps in Personnel Management

When we go beyond statistical analysis we get to the "rock bottom" of personnel management. These are the steps we must take:

(a) Increase our intake of young people.

(b) Balance our intake and total separations.

(c) Determine the individuals as well as the number of grades GS-7, 9, 11, 12, 13 and 14 that should leave the Agency in order to bring in new and younger personnel. In this regard drastic action will not be taken. However, we

(1) must hire at a more rapid rate, and

(2) must increase separations.

It appears that the authority for a RIF already exists, but at present we do not have DCI approval.

(d) Develop a basis for providing and establishing benefits for "early retirement."

(e) Impress supervisors with the necessity for accurate Fitness Reports since we are more and more coming down to "rankings" in determining who should be separated.

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Frictional losses can be described as those losses occasioned by personnel who are not actually part of the work force, that is those in training, enroute between assignments, etc. In such a situation the individuals concerned should not be assigned to a Staffing Complement position, and to accomodate these people we have the Development Complement. However, some offices use the Development Complement as a "last battalion" for borderline cases while others have assigned very good people to it. The one thing that the Office of Personnel wants to accomplish is "to have everyone out from under the rug," and Mr. Stewart stressed that the one place not to ~~bury~~ ^{bury} people is in an overseas position. This is an unfair action especially to the overseas station or base. (In this regard a request was made from the floor that an article appear in the Support Bulletin regarding the purpose and validity of assignments to the Development Complement.)

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mr. Bissell's Comments - Support Conference - October 1959

1. Mr. Bissell chose to address himself primarily to management responsibilities particularly as they affected him in carrying out his responsibilities as DDP. He established as ground rules for his talk and for our understanding of it that it was to be a free and frank expression of his opinions without qualifications which might be appropriate in individual instances. In other words, we were warned not to take everything he said precisely at face value. He chose to confine himself largely to the non-substantive aspects of DDP management.

2. His first concern was with the developing symptoms of the disease of bureaucracy. He listed four symptoms in DDP. First: the size of the headquarters of the Clandestine Services. He believes that of all government agencies we have the worst ratio of headquarters to field strength. This is particularly true when, as is valid, the CS share of the support components is included. "We have five people in headquarters to one officer in the field watching this wretched officer at work." The second symptom is the number of people involved in a particular action. Using projects as examples, he spoke of 20 signatures prior to the six signatures in FRC and the two after that. The third symptom although not unique to the CS or to the Agency is multiplicity of written guidance. This is a disease of bigness but still is serious. He said that one man reading everything that came out can barely keep even to say nothing of accomplishing revisions. Worst of all, he believes are the actual or proposed CSI's and CSN's. The fourth symptom, endemic to government is the pure volume of paper flow. He said his first reaction upon assuming the job of DDP was outrage. He recognizes now that there is no quick formula. Worst of all are cables where cryptonyms plus cablese add to the burden of the volume. He recognized that one reason was the qualities of the Director who reads so much and everyone else must keep up.

3. He then made two personal conjectures as to the causes. First he called excessive defensiveness. He recognized that concern with protection of the Agency and its activities both within and without was a proper pre-occupation. These are the necessities of our business. But it was his belief that we are excessively defensive and believed that some of this is a reflection of the past. He mentioned the early feuds of the Agency /Editor's comment - the OSO/OPC days/ which he knew were as bitter as any in government. Another reason was the enormous expansion we had over short

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periods of time during which we acquired very many inexperienced personnel and misfits, many mistakes were made, and finally General Smith had to call a halt. But the then-ordered conservatism is no longer valid. He suggests that if we are too worried about error, then we are not sufficiently concerned with purpose. A second reason for the defensiveness he ascribes to a policy of drifting with appalling rapidity to a position of being over-controlled by outside agencies. He listed three, Bureau of the Budget, State, and 5412, saying that the latter are subtler in technique and more dangerous in purpose. Of State, he said the diplomatic mind by the very nature of its training and development is not fitted for our kind of business and that State has gone beyond policy guidance.

4. With this general background, he then addressed himself to specific problems of general management. He set as two twin principles maximum effective feasible delegation to the line officer with maximum effective feasible liberty of action. One of the obstacles to accomplishing these is that our business is presently conducted in the same great detail at all levels, contrary to the principle of hierarchic organization. This is in part a result of the Director's nature and in part that we don't organize our work in units larger than the individual projects. As a result, the programs are not the controlling instrument. A second obstacle naturally growing out of the first is that no one uses the programs and projects for general policy guidance. This is not a peculiarity of Allen W. Dulles but is a result of the way issues come to him. Programs as presently organized are only compilations of other smaller decisions made elsewhere. Hence, when the Director signs a project with all its details, this is not only an imposition on him but means that we are bound and must meet the same level of approval for changes in these details. This process overloads the senior officer and overcircumscribes the case officer.

5. He next addressed himself to corrections or changes to effect corrections, laying down as a foundation: Delegation downward is not possible without clean delineation of responsibility or jurisdiction; the common law of bureaucracy gives the coordinator a veto power; delegation with diffusion is not delegation. With this as a starting point, he then discussed the role of the senior staffs. As presently constituted, one third of their activity is staff work and two thirds provision of services of common concern. For various reasons, the senior staffs have tried to be supervisors of divisional case officers. This is altogether improper and unnecessary. He proposed to organize the staffs by function, manned by specialists, to provide expertise and planning support and writing of doctrine. Among others, he would boost our capability for covert military action through improvement of the staff structure and functions. This, of course, would be paralleled in other areas of our mission. The second correction he would effect would be to make the programs more important as instruments of control. Broad policy guidance per se has almost been completely lacking in the history of the Agency. Instead of this, we have relied on the presentation upward, presumably based on the RMD's of Operational Programs with attached lists of scores and scores of projects about which top management knows hardly anything. He would revise the cycle with definitive policy guidance from DDP by mid-November providing an allocation of resources and then the program developed

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from this guidance to be submitted to the DDP in February to go as now to the PRC in March and April. The budget presentation would not be the first step in the program. It is too far in advance for valid operational policy guidance. He would change the program content setting up at most perhaps 25 categories of operations showing last year's allocations and next year's plan. Approval of them would permit operational flexibility within categories. And last, he would make a greater delegation of project authority but with criteria of more than just dollar level.

6. In response to questions two items are worth noting. First, in regard to the case officer use of the staff expertise, "If you need a lawyer, don't use one and get in trouble, you should be fired."

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Robert S. Wattles
Chief, FE/Support

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OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS



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[redacted] the Deputy Director of Communications, outlined the tremendous advances in staff and agent communications in the past eight years and particularly in recent months.

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Due to technical improvements in equipment and a greatly improved position in the matter of allocated channels, Agency staff communications have increased, in eight years, from one to twelve million groups per month without anything like a comparable increase in Communications personnel.

[redacted] and other Communications personnel exhibited and demonstrated certain items of new equipment and identified other equipment that is being engineered and developed for Communications facilities. In short order these facilities promise to exceed the capability or practical necessity of the Agency to use them at their maximum potential.

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THE ROLE OF SUPPORT
AS SEEN BY AN AREA DIVISION CHIEF

Mr. James Critchfield, Chief EE

Mr. Critchfield began his address by reviewing his early experiences with support personnel of the Agency. After discussing briefly the stages of development of support activity over the years, he concluded that, in his opinion, today's support structure is approximately proper to meet Agency needs, provided five adjustments are made. He stated that although management is influenced directly by the personalities of the persons in control, the most standardized feature of Agency management has been the placement of support persons with common concepts and practices around the world.

Early in his address Mr. Critchfield indicated that currently the support of operations is both close and effective but that it needs to be even more so. He stated that support personnel and considerations need to be integrated to a much greater degree in complicated operational situations and plans.

During a presentation of his concept of personnel management, Mr. Critchfield placed great stress on the fact that those in a position of command responsibility have a primary responsibility for the management of personnel. The existence of Personnel Officers in the components of the Clandestine Services shifts some of the load of work from the officers in the command line but does not relieve them of one bit of responsibility for their personnel. Pursuing this thought further, he declared that, in his opinion, the panel structure of the career services is not the proper vehicle for resolving problems of assignment, reassignment and training. He believes that such problems are not best handled by committees since these problems are direct command and leadership functions within the Clandestine Services and since the problems are not, and cannot be a major personal responsibility of each panel member even if the member treats them seriously and conscientiously. Mr. Critchfield does, however, believe that the panels represent a fair and efficient system for developing promotion criteria and accomplishing promotions.

Mr. Critchfield expressed his belief that the Agency's Support Officers, both at Headquarters and in the field, are not being utilized as effectively or as broadly as their competence warrants. He would particularly like to see them used more extensively in every stage of planning as well as in other functions from which they may now be more or less excluded.

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With respect to the possibility that certain Agency elements may be satellited on one or more large field stations and therefore might have area responsibilities and communication channels independent of the Chief of Station, Mr. Critchfield indicated that on principle he is opposed to establishing such facilities. He does not wish to confuse the responsibility of the Chief of Station. If smaller stations need such support, the larger station (not through the device of a satellited element) should determine the requirements, plan to provide the support, and sustain its own capability in the matter.

During a question-and-answer session, Mr. Critchfield stated that the expanded role of the Support Officer should include:

a. Participation in the whole problem of security, first in physical security and later in the fringes of operational security.

b. Participation in nearly every aspect of area division and field station planning.

c. Closer coordination with line officials in handling special personnel cases such as those involving compassionate and security problems.

d. Greater integration into operations (Mr. Critchfield stated that he has never had an operation compromised by using his support personnel as completely as desired).

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REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF
SUPPORT PROCEDURES COMMITTEE

This special committee appointed by Colonel White in August, 1959, has been examining support procedures which come under the jurisdiction of DD/S, in an effort to cut down, simplify, make smoother support activities wherever possible. They are attempting to work first with self-contained problems, possible of solution without extensive and basic change in too many areas. To date these have been the chief areas of study:

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3. Designation of authorizing and approving officials by title.
 4. Simplification of travel procedures.
 5. Simplification of personal processing procedures.
 6. Concept of a Headquarters supplement statement for all Field Regulations.
 7. Condensation of LOG Regulations on Procurement, Supply, Transportation, Real Estate and Construction from a 40-50 page section to a 5-page unit. (This was accomplished with the excellent cooperation of LOG.)
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
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SA CAREER

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Question

1. What long-range plans should now be formulated (a) to provide for maximum developmental and promotional opportunities for senior SA personnel, (b) to insure that new blood is brought into SA service at proper levels; and (c) to be sure that such new personnel receive adequate training and/or experience for such responsibility as those who are now GS-14 and above who move upward or elsewhere?

Committee Recommendations

2. It was recommended by the committee that the initial step involved is to:

- (a) Provide an interchange of senior personnel between the offices of DDS and the SA Career Service.
- (b) To insure that new blood is brought into the SA Service at proper levels it was recommended that (1) GS-7 thru GS-11 Administrative Assistants and Officers assigned by DDP Panels who are performing administrative responsibilities; (2) Junior Officer Trainees (JOTS) within DDP; and (3) specialists in support offices who have potential to serve in the field of support, be screened for consideration as future support designees.

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- (c) Internal training programs in the field of general support; and planned rotations within DDS and DDP with or without change in career designation, would provide a means of developing such personnel to assumed greater responsibilities within the SA Career Service.

3. For the purpose of implementation the SA Career Service is presently established to implement the above recommendations.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DELEGATION AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY

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Question

We have heard from the Director and from DD/P their philosophy about greater delegation of authority and responsibility. DD/S strongly supports their views. What positive steps should the DD/S components and personnel take to insure that this policy is vigorously pursued?

I. Statement of problem:

How to give force and effect to the philosophy of delegation authority?

II. Discussion:

A. Question not clear

1. We question the premise.
2. Agency, DD/P, or Support only?

B. What is authority and what is function?

C. Formal delegation, inherent delegation. (We ignore here the informal delegation.)

D. Watering down - formal giving and taking away.

E. Can't legislate delegation.

F. Delegation across organizational lines.

III. Recommendations:

- A. Get from Director a broad statement of principle that delegation (as final as legally possible) be to the lowest level possible consistent with competence.
- B. Define "authority", establish principles and procedures (including the instruments) of delegation and redelegation.


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- C. Determine what authorities exist, may and have been delegated and/or redelegated.
- D. Determine where and how operating officials and subordinates feel hampered by lack of delegation.
- E. Compile, rewrite, reissue delegations, etc. as indicated.
- F. Continuing program of indoctrination -- not legislation.

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Question

1. The DD/S and the heads of DD/S Offices and Staffs have by regulation staff responsibility for their functional specialties on a world-wide basis. To what degree is it now possible for these staff officers to discharge the responsibility which they are given by this regulation? What steps might be taken to improve the present situation without doing violence to the rightful prerogative of the command echelons in the CS in order to insure the optimum effectiveness of administration throughout the world?

I. To what degree is this responsibility discharged today and where is it weak?

A. Means in effect today

1. Technical regulations and instructions
2. Regulatory reports
3. Audit Reports
4. Fitness Reports
5. Senior and specialized DD/S TDY-ers
6. Monthly reports (Security, Medical)
7. Debriefing of returnees
8. I.G. Reports
9. Career Management (Monitorship of career designees by Career Services)

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
B. Deficiencies in staff supervision at present

1. Headquarters inability to assess the level of judgment on great variety of problems faced by SA type.
2. Communication problems - tardiness and difficulty of interpretation.
3. Inability to transmit timely technical instructions without concurrence of laymen in operating components.

II. Recommendations

- A. Consideration of allowing DD/S officer to transmit technical instructions to field without all operating component concurrences. Referral to only one point delegated by DD/P.
- B. Personal representative of DD/S to visit, once per tour, each Support Chief or in case of small stations, the COS, preferably within first 6-12 months of tour.

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III. Colonel White's Summary Remarks

After a quick review of the main points in each presentation of the Conference, Colonel White identified some of the main "themes" discernible throughout the sessions.

The Agency will be continuing in the next few years -- barring international crises of the significance of the Korean situation -- in a process of settling, adjusting, stabilizing.

There will be further reduction in Agency size.

There is a widespread recognition of the need and importance of delegating greater authority to line managers at all levels where responsibility and competence to accept the delegation are present.

The Agency is being looked at more critically all the time, both from within and without.

There is a need to further clarify command and staff responsibility within the Agency -- at all levels.

All of these points indicate a general interest within the Agency in improved management and a determination on the part of top-level keymen to assist in bringing it about.

Colonel White concluded his remarks by commenting that although all speakers had acclaimed the growth of effective support facilities and had given a vote of confidence to them, there were still improvements to be made. As one means of effecting this improvement, he suggested and urged that all Support and Deputy Support Officers do all within their power to improve rapport between the Operating Divisions and the Support Offices.



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